Jewish World Review / Nov. 12, 1998 /23 Mar-Cheshvan, 5759
The Middle East peace process is alive, but the challenge to Saddam is dead? Time to get with the program, Bubba!
ONCE AGAIN THE U.S. IS CONTEMPLATING air strikes against Iraq.
It is the credibility of the United States that is on the line.
This time what one administration official is quoted as saying is "diplomacy
backed by meetings" should come to an end. On March 23, 1998 Henry
Kissinger wrote for the Los Angeles Times syndicate a column titled "Our
Shilly-Shally 'Strategy' on Saddam". Indeed, Dr. Kissinger was correct.
UN-U.S. sanctions have been playing to Saddam's advantage. He
attacks the sanctions regime as detrimental to the Iraqi people, while
in fact employing his resources not to feed his people but his arsenal.
Iraq has requested "a comprehensive review" of its compliance with UN
sanctions, and soon enough rejected it. Even Russian Foreign Minister
Igor Ivanov considered this attitude as "inexplicable".
The administration's need for a coalition to go to war is unrealistic and
phony. The Clinton administration, in the last two years, has received
clear messages from the French, Chinese, and especially our so-called
allies, the Russians, that they will not approve any UN security
resolution on the use of force. The administration statements that "all
options are open" have been repeated to a point where Saddam Hussein no
longer takes them seriously. The so-called threats have been no more
than a signal to Saddam that he can continue to defy the U.S. and UN,
and successfully build his arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. As
Henry Kissinger concluded in his commentary, "Inevitably, Saddam Hussein
emerged from the crisis in a politically and psychologically
strengthened position."
How should the administration deal with Saddam Hussein now? It's high time for them to be
honest with Congress and the American people. The administration
must declare that, since the United Nations and our allies are unwilling
to join us in a coalition to impose severe sanctions upon Saddam and
sustain the collapsing UNSCOM regime, there is no other way short of
continued humiliation to confront Saddam with the kind of action he
understands.
I speak of severe military action.
The destruction of the arsenal is tantamount to the end of the Saddam regime, for he and his
weapons are symbiotic. We must conceive of a surprise attack on Saddam.
We know from the inspectors and other Middle Eastern intelligence
services exactly where the arsenal is hidden. We must study carefully
all the so-called palaces and other strategic military and weapons
production facilities, and use surgical strikes to destroy all or most
of them.
The argument given by strategists is that the air attack on Iraq
in 1991 was not really successful, as it did not either destroy the
greater part of Saddam's arsenal or his regime. Nor have more recent
disparate missile attacks changed his behavior. Those in the
administration that argue that UNSCOM has succeeded in eliminating more
of Saddam's arsenal than the war did are quite correct, and UNSCOM
should be awarded the highest accolades for what its superb
accomplishments.
But UNSCOM has become hostage to Saddam's chicaneries.
Therefore, with us knowing more than ever about the locations and methods of
production through UNSCOM and other
intelligence services, we must end the operation and free ourselves to do
what we failed to do in 1991.
How to go about it is the job of the Joint Chiefs and the
intelligence services. Nothing will be fulfilled, however, without
presidential will and persistence. The president realizes -- or by now should realize -- that the
diplomatic option is over. The only solution remaining is, despite the
president's reluctance, is to employ brutal, accurate air power. He must
bite the bullet because the only way to destroy Saddam Hussein's regime
is to destroy his arsenal.
What will the political, diplomatic, and military consequences
be of an American failure to deal with Saddam militarily: 1) It will
destabilize American credibility in the area.
It is true that the
Saudis and the Gulf States are opposed to an American-led coalition war,
but it is also true that they are shaking in their boots about Saddam
and that unofficially they know American credibility is not of great
value.
2) It will affect the Israel-Palestine peace process by turning
the before-Wye American formula upside down.
The argument of the Arab
leaders, after all, has been that as long as there was no movement in the peace process,
Saddam could not be punished without punishing Netanyahu equally. Now
the reverse is true. The peace process is alive and the challenge to
Saddam is dead.
It is high time for the United States to insist that the most
serious problem in the Middle East is no longer the peace process but
Saddam Hussein.
Secretary Cohen's shuttle diplomacy in an effort to
recreate the 1991 coalition against Saddam is an exercise in futility.
Since there is no reason to believe that an Iraqi opposition group is
capable of bringing an end to Saddam's regime, supporting such a group
is not a substitute for real action. Since 1991 we have learned that
diplomacy and sanctions, in and of themselves, do not work. No diplomacy
will be successful without the credible and sustaining use of force.
Only sustained, precise American military action
By Amos Perlmutter
JWR contributor Amos Perlmutter, a professor of political
science and sociology at American University,
is editor of the Journal of Strategic Studies.
His numerous books on Middle East affairs include Two Minutes
Over Baghdad (Corgi, 1983).
01/01/98:
Saddam's Predictable
Defiance