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Jewish World Review December 19, 2008 / 22 Kislev, 5769 Betting on a dead horse By Caroline B. Glick
Cheered on by the Olmert-Livni-Barak government, this week the UN Security
Council passed Resolution 1850 which among other things calls on all UN
member nations to provide political and financial support for Fatah chief
Mahmoud Abbas's Fatah government. And no doubt the call will be answered
with enthusiasm. Over the past year, Fatah received $1.7 billion in
international aid — some $600 million more than the world's foreign policy
gurus promised to give last December.
But Fatah is a dead horse. Even if it were to sign a peace deal with Israel
— and really meant to keep it — the deal would be a dead letter because
the Palestinian people themselves want neither peace with Israel nor Fatah.
Fatah lost the Palestinian Authority's January 2006 legislative elections to
Hamas. In June 2007 it was violently ousted from Gaza by Hamas. And next
month, on January 9 Abbas's term of office as PA Chairman will end. If Abbas
refuses to relinquish power on January 10, as far as the Palestinian people
are concerned, Hamas will be right to reject his authority and to seek to
overthrow his government in Judea and Samaria.
With the massive backing he enjoys from the US, in all likelihood Abbas will
remain in power on January 10 and will refuse to run for reelection.
Palestinian journalists and Fatah officials in Ramallah readily acknowledge
that were Abbas to face Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in open elections,
Haniyeh would win big. And this is Fatah's fault.
Over the past 13 years, Palestinian society has come to view jihad against
Israel and the US as its definitive goal. And Fatah brought about this state
of affairs.
Fatah indoctrinated the Palestinians to support jihad through a massive
campaign of media incitement. Fatah has controlled the Palestinian media
since 1994. Although it lost that control in Gaza in June 2007, aside from
declaring their support for Hamas, Gaza's media today are no different than
they were when Fatah was in charge.
By convincing Palestinian society to support jihad, Fatah paved the way for
Hamas's takeover. Although Fatah operatives have killed more Israelis than
Hamas has, Hamas still has more credibility in the jihad department. This
owes mainly to Fatah's image as a US and Israeli stooge.
Fatah's American and Israeli champions justify their support for it by
noting that since Hamas took over Gaza, Fatah has been willing to fight
Hamas. But Fatah — which is begging Israel to reconquer Gaza for it — has
not tempered its commitment to Israel's destruction. The reason it fights
Hamas is because Fatah's leaders rightly view Hamas as a mortal threat.
In an interview with Jerusalem Post editor David Horovitz last week, US
Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton, who as US Security Coordinator for the PA has been
working with Fatah militias for the past three years, praised the US-trained
Fatah forces now deployed in Jenin, Nablus and Hebron as "state-builders."
Dayton defended Fatah's behavior during Hamas's coup in Gaza. Noting that
some 250 Fatah members were killed during the coup, Dayton claimed that
Fatah forces fought well before they surrendered. In his words, "These
aren't people that simply, immediately raised their hands and surrendered. I
know this. It took five days…They were clearly outgunned and still they
stood their ground for five days."
Perhaps this is true. But what Dayton ignored is the fact that Hamas would
never have been able to build up a force capable of outgunning Fatah forces
if Fatah leaders hadn't let it.
In spite of the fact that the entire Israeli-Palestinian peace process was
predicated on Fatah's pledge to disarm and disband Hamas, from 1994 until
the 2007 coup, Fatah and Hamas were strategic allies and constant
collaborators in their common war against Israel. Indeed, at the time of the
coup, as partners in the PA's unity government, Fatah and Hamas were closer
than ever.
When on January 9 Fatah finds itself lacking any legal basis to lead the PA,
Hamas will be sitting on top of the world. In addition to enjoying the
support of the majority of Palestinians, Hamas is now second only to
Hizbullah in Iran's terror proxy pecking order.
Hamas cemented its alliance with Iran in December 2005 and it has only
benefitted from its proxy status. Iran has provided Hamas with hundreds of
millions of dollars. And to Iran's monies must be added US and European
financial assistance. Using the massive inflows of US and European
contributions, Fatah transfers tens of millions of dollars to Gaza each
month to pay the salaries of 70,000 Fatah-aligned PA employees in Gaza. That
money frees Hamas from the need to develop Gaza's economy enabling it to
devote itself to building up its war machine against Israel.
Iranian military assistance includes both training and equipment. Thanks to
Israel's decision six months ago to implement a largely one-sided ceasefire
towards Hamas, since June, Hamas has doubled both the size and the range of
its rocket and missile arsenals. Today it fields more than 10,000 rockets,
missiles and mortars and has extended their range from 20 to 40 kilometers
placing major cities like Beersheva and Ashdod under threat.
If the government ever permits the IDF to defend the south by launching an
offensive in Gaza, Hamas will be able to put up a very strong fight. Thanks
to Iranian assistance and Israeli passivity, today Hamas's forces are
organized much like Hizbullah forces were in 2006. Hamas has raised a
16,000-man army divided into eight brigades. Its forces possess advanced
anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles. Like Hizbullah, Hamas has developed
sophisticated intelligence capabilities. And like Hizbullah it has
constructed fifty kilometers of tunnels and bunkers along Gaza's borders
with Israel and Egypt.
As a member of the Iranian camp, Hamas deters Israel from attacking it by
raising the specter that any serious IDF operation in Gaza will be answered
by the entire axis. An Israeli strike in Gaza is liable to be greeted not
only by Hamas but by Hizbullah, Syria and Iran.
Hamas allies drove this point home over the past week. As Hamas escalated
its rocket offensive against Israel, Iran launched state-sponsored rallies
in support of Hamas and announced it is sending a "humanitarian aid" ship to
Gaza to break Israel's naval blockade. Hizbullah launched identical protests
and likewise stated its intention of sending a "humanitarian aid" ship to
Hamas.
Then too, Hamas-controlled UNRWA announced on Thursday that it is suspending
its food assistance to Gaza to protest Israel's blockade of the Gaza
coastline. This in turn will generate an outcry in Europe and give Iran and
Hizbullah an excuse to attack Israel for refusing to let their "humanitarian
aid" ships dock in Gaza.
To date, Israel's strategy for contending with Fatah's demise has been to
deny it. As for Hamas, the Olmert-Livni-Barak government has adopted Defense
Minister Ehud Barak's favored policy of speaking loudly and carrying no
stick. As Abbas moves from failure to failure, they cling to him ever more
tightly as Israel's irreplaceable interlocutor.
After Hamas renewed its war against Israel this week, Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and Barak have all threatened to take
action against Hamas. But at the same time, they have sent emissaries to
Egypt to beg Hamas to reconsider its decision.
Since Abbas gave his final refusal last month to Olmert's pleas to finalize
a peace deal with Israel before US President George W. Bush leaves office,
and since Hamas renewed its missile offensive against Israel last month,
Livni, Barak and Olmert have found it impossible to justify their policies
to the public. With elections around the corner and with dozens of rockets
and mortars now being launched against the country daily, Yediot
Ahronot'sleftist military columnist Alex Fishman tried to help them
out.
In a front-page commentary on Thursday, Fishman gave four major
justifications for their decision to allow Hamas to build up its armed
forces without Israeli challenge for the past six months. First, he argued
that had Israel not given Hamas a free pass for six months, Israel wouldn't
have been able to negotiate the surrender of Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem to
Fatah.
Presumably this is so because had Israel opted to fight Hamas, Fatah would
have sided with Hamas against Israel. Of course, given Fatah's preference
for Hamas over Israel, it is unclear why negotiating with Fatah is in
Israel's interest. But Fishman ignores that issue.
Fishman then claimed that by not attacking Hamas for six months, Israel has
allowed two Palestinian "states" to be established — the Hamas state in Gaza
and the US and Israeli-sponsored Fatah state in Judea and Samaria. And
again, this is supposed to be a good thing because if only one Hamas-Fatah
state existed in both areas, then the Olmert-Livni-Barak government wouldn't
have been able to negotiate the surrender of Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem to
Fatah. The fact that Hamas can and will overthrow a Fatah-run state in
Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem as easily as it overthrew the Fatah-run state
in Gaza went unnoted by Fishman for some reason.
Fishman also argued that Israel's decision to stand down against Hamas has
improved Israel's relations with Egypt. This assertion is rings hollow
though. Throughout this period of supposedly improved relations, Egypt has
continued to turn a blind eye to massive Iranian arms transfers to Hamas
through its territory.
Finally, Fishman asserted that Israel's unilateral ceasefire towards Hamas
has been a good thing for Israel because it facilitated the return of the
so-called Saudi peace plan to the regional agenda. But since the Saudi plan
requires Israel to commit national suicide by withdrawing to the
indefensible 1949 armistice lines and accepting millions of hostile,
foreign-born Arabs as immigrants, it is hard to see why its return is a
positive development for Israel.
And still, with Hamas now in the driver's seat and ready to roll out its new
war against Israel together with its many allies, everyone who is anyone is
putting his money on Abbas, who in under three weeks will lose his last
vestige of democratic legitimacy.
In his interview with the Post, Jones couldn't think of a way that Hamas
could be ejected from Gaza. On the other hand, it is self-evident that if
the people betting on Abbas get their way and Israel gives Fatah Judea and
Samaria and Jerusalem, Hamas will quickly take over those areas as well.
That's what happens when you bet on a dead horse. You lose.
JWR contributor Caroline B. Glick is the senior Middle East Fellow at the Center for Security Policy in Washington, DC and the deputy managing editor of The Jerusalem Post. Comment by clicking here.
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