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Jewish World Review July 27, 2005 / 20 Tammuz, 5765 Judicial philosophy is key to court service By Robert Robb
http://www.JewishWorldReview.com |
In the 1970s, liberal economist John Kenneth Galbraith testified against
the Lockheed bailout before a Senate committee. Afterwards, conservative
icon Barry Goldwater approached Galbraith and said that he agreed
completely with Galbraith's testimony.
In response, Galbraith reportedly deadpanned: In that case, perhaps I
should reconsider my position.
I'm feeling a similar sentiment. I think I mostly agree with the oleaginous
Charles Schumer about the proper role of the U.S. Senate in the
confirmation of judges.
The Democratic senator, who incarnates the political cliché of being
unavoidable for comment, has been contending — in a 2001 New York Times
column and recently in a speech to the Center for American Progress — that
the Senate should explicitly probe and consider the ideology of judges.
This is imprecisely put. Ideology refers to a person's general beliefs
about political matters. That's only relevant to the extent a judicial
nominee is likely to use those views as a guide in deciding cases.
There is, however, such a thing as judicial philosophy — a general approach
to deciding cases. And judicial philosophy is very much what the Senate
should examine and consider in deciding whether to confirm judges.
The conventional wisdom is that this is either inappropriate or difficult
to probe in a confirmation process. Judicial philosophy is best understood
in the context of specific cases. But prospective judges understandably
take the position that they will not discuss cases that may come before
them. Even discussing cases that have already been decided is tricky, since
they form the relevant precedents for subsequent cases that arise.
As a result, prospective judges use the model perfected by Sandra Day
O'Connor in her confirmation hearing in 1981. In response to questions
about specific cases, O'Connor was encyclopedic in reciting the facts and
legal issues involved, offering everything but her views about those
issues.
In 1987, Robert Bork's extensive and often expressive views about legal
issues were used to hang him. And prospective jurists have been Sphinx-like
ever since.
The confirmation process is a losing proposition for nominees. Rarely will
they gain votes by what they say. But an incautious word can lose those
votes and even the job.
So, expect Bush's nominee for the U.S. Supreme Court, John Roberts, to
follow the precedent of his predecessor, and employ a strategy of mum's the
word on anything truly worth knowing.
That may be smart confirmation politics, but it's unsatisfactory regarding
the advice and consent function of the Senate.
The Senate, after all, is a political body. It's not particularly qualified
to judge the legal qualifications of judges.
An independent judiciary is vital to the functioning of a free society.
That means a judiciary free of political pressure or accountability in
deciding particular cases.
But, in a system of checks and balances, the people have a right to
influence the general judicial philosophy under which they are governed,
gradually and over time. And that can only occur through the president's
appointment power and the Senate's confirmation authority.
And Schumer, of course, goes too far. In his Center for American Progress
speech, he lists over 30 specific cases on which a prospective judge should
express himself. And he says that list isn't exhaustive.
That's not an attempt to ascertain a general judicial philosophy. That's an
attempt to uncover grist to destroy a nomination.
But on the larger point, that the purpose of the confirmation process
should be to ascertain and weigh judicial philosophy, Schumer is right. As
he is right that senators already do that, even if they say they don't.
In a less contentious age, this would be done fairly and openly, with due
respect for not forcing nominees to prejudge cases that might come before
them, or to express themselves on issues about which they have not
carefully reflected.
But even in a contentious age, judicial philosophy should be the key to the
inquiry. The judicial philosophy under which we are governed shouldn't be a
matter of potluck.
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JWR contributor Robert Robb is a columnist for The Arizona Republic. Comment by clicking here.
© 2005, The Arizona Republic |
Arnold Ahlert | |||||||||
