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Jewish World Review May 25, 2007 / 8 Sivan, 5766 Statecraft in the absence of statesmen By Caroline B. Glick
Any analysis of the reasonableness of these initiatives must begin with two
questions. First, do the relevant parties share enough common interests to
enable them to reach an agreement that will be mutually beneficial? Second,
are do the sides have leaders who are competent to properly identify those
interests and work to advance them?
According to Ma'ariv, "The Prime Minister has become convinced that
negotiations with Syria and a possible peace agreement will significantly
alter the regional strategic situation and facilitate the isolation of Iran
and a solution to the problem with Hizbullah. This is especially the case,"
the newspaper reported, "against the backdrop of the collapse of Fatah and
of [Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, a.k.a.] Abu Mazen, and the
fact that there is no chance for a diplomatic initiative with the
Palestinians in the near future."
The report added that the IDF's high command believes that Israel can avert
war with Syria by negotiating the surrender of the Golan Heights to
Damascus.
So Olmert then sees three reasons to engage Damascus in negotiations about
an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. He believes that doing so can
prevent a war between the two countries. He believes that such negotiations
will weaken Syria's protector Iran. And he is interested in negotiations
because he feels he needs to do something and he can't negotiate the
surrender of Judea and Samaria with Hamas.
Unfortunately, all of Olmert's rationales for opening negotiations with
Syria are based on false assumptions. A review of the results of the US's
current much less radical bid to appease Syria in Iraq demonstrates this
clearly.
The insurgency being waged against US-led coalition forces in Iraq today is
directed by Syria and Iran. In an attempt to decrease the dimensions of the
war against the US and its allies, last month the Americans opened direct,
high-level contacts with Damascus. First, Speaker of the House of
Representatives Nancy Pelosi paid a visit to Syrian dictator Bashar Assad.
Pelosi, who supports a US retreat from Iraq, praised the Ba'athist regime
and so ended the isolation Damascus has been relegated to since it ordered
the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri in February
2005. Although the Bush administration condemned Pelosi's visit, weeks later
it followed her lead. At the beginning of the month, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice held a meeting with her Syrian counterpart Walid Muallem in
Sharm e-Sheikh.
The Americans hoped that their direct contacts with Syria would moderate its
behavior. Unfortunately, the opposite as occurred. Far from moderating
Syria, US moves to mollify it have served to embolden Syria to advance its
hostile policies. In the aftermath of Pelosi's visit, the regime cracked
down on its internal opposition rounding up dissidents and sentencing them
to prolonged prison terms.
Rice's meeting with Muallem failed to put a damper on Syrian sponsorship of
the insurgents. On Monday a US official in Iraq said, "Our best estimate is
that 85 to 90 percent of all the suicide bombers are foreign. Ninety percent
plus come through Syria."
Beyond Iraq and internal dissent in Syria, the legitimacy Washington has
conferred on Damascus is emboldening the Syrians to destabilize Lebanon. The
Fatah Islam Palestinian jihadist group that is now leading the hostilities
in northern Lebanon is a creation of Syrian intelligence. Today the Syrians
are keen to destabilize Lebanon in a bid to intimidate Lebanese lawmakers
into rejecting the UN tribunal which is set to try Syrian officials for
their role in Hariri's assassination.
All of these Syrian actions point to the clear conclusion that the American
appeasement efforts have backfired. Were Israel to similarly seek to appease
Damascus, and to do so by far more radically offering to surrender the
strategically vital Goaln Heights to Syrian control, far from diminishing
the prospect of war, Israel would likely exacerbate the likelihood of a
Syrian or Syrian-sponsored strike against it.
Similarly, it is doubtful that opening negotiations on an Israeli withdrawal
from the Golan Heights would serve to weaken Syria's relations with Iran.
Why would Syria consider distancing itself from Teheran when its close
alliance with the ayatollahs is what is provoking the US and Israel to
mollify it?
So if offering to discuss an Israeli surrender of the Golan Heights to Syria
will raise the probability of war and embolden the Syrians to intensify
their alliance with Iran, the only remaining rationale for speaking to them
is Olmert's desire to have some sort of diplomatic platform to stand on.
Here the issue of a leader's competence to advance his nation's interests
through diplomatic initiatives comes into play. By expressing a willingness
to imperil the security of the state by opening talks with Syria that will
only radicalize Damascus still further, Olmert is demonstrating that he is
incapable of responsibly advancing Israel's interests. Indeed, his
willingness to engage in surrender talks with Damascus shows that he doesn't
even understand what Israel's national interests are.
If Olmert wishes to prevent the coming war, he should be preparing for it.
This he must do by highlighting Syria's radicalism and by neutralizing
Syria's terror networks in Gaza which would be used against Israel in any
war scenario.
So while there is no possibility of launching a diplomatic effort with Syria
or the Palestinians, what about the Jordanian initiative?
According to the Ma'ariv report, the Jordanian plan is based on a
recognition that with Hamas in control of the Palestinian Authority Israel
has no Palestinian partner to whom it could surrender Judea and Samaria. In
light of this, Israel is incapable of adopting the so-called Arab peace
initiative which demands that Israel withdraw its citizens and military
forces to behind the 1940 armistice lines.
The Jordanians are offering to fill the void by replacing the Palestinians.
Israel, they say, should give Jordan Judea and Samaria as part of a
Jordanian-Palestinian confederation under Hashemite control. In short, the
Jordanians are resuscitating the view that Jordan is Palestine. King
Abdullah is using former Jordanian prime minister Abed Salam Majali as his
envoy to convince Israelis to accept newest idea.
An assessment of the opportunities and threats inherent in this offer must
begin with an analysis of Jordan's interests. Bluntly stated, the Hashemite
monarchy finds itself firmly lodged between the Iraqi rock and the
Palestinian hard place and so is in danger of being overthrown. The
possibility that US forces will withdraw from Iraq without first stabilizing
the country constitutes an existential threat to the Hashemites who
understand that after defeating the Great Satan, Jordan will be the next
target on the Syrian and Iranian sponsored insurgents' list.
As to the Palestinians, since Hamas won the Palestinian Authority elections
last year, the jihadist group, and its sister organization the Muslim
Brotherhood, have seen a steep rise in their popularity in Jordan where more
than 70 percent of the population are Palestinians. The Jordanian offer to
take over Judea and Samaria then can be seen as a bid to ride the
Palestinian tiger in the hopes of taming the beast before it devours Jordan.
In contrast to the situation with Syria, Israel's national interests overlap
those of Jordan. Israel too will be imperiled by a resurgent eastern front
in the event of an American pullout from Iraq. Then too, Israel will pay a
steep price if the jihadist forces on both sides of the Jordan River unite.
Yet, given the dangers that both countries face, it would be inexcusable for
Israel to even consider transferring control over the Jordan Valley to the
Jordanian military. At the same time, the societal fragmentation that would
ensue from an Israeli withdrawal from its heartland in Judea and Samaria
would undermine Israel's ability to rally as a society against external
enemies.
While the gulf between what Jordan proposes and what Israel can accept is
large, the fact remains that the states' shared interests are significant
enough to form the basis for mutually beneficial discussions. As MK Benny
Elon has been arguing for years, Israel could offer Jordan functional
sovereignty over the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria. At the same time,
Israel could assert its sovereignty over what the Oslo accords refer to as
Area C. Area C includes all of the Israeli communities in Judea and Samaria,
the hinterlands and the Jordan Valley.
The assertion of functional sovereignty by Jordan over the Palestinians in
Judea and Samaria would include the return of their Jordanian citizenship
which the late King Hussein abrogated in 1988. Such functional sovereignty
would undermine the PA's political rationale and could act as a moderating
force for Palestinian society as a whole — both in Judea and Samaria and in
Jordan.
The assertion of Israeli sovereignty over Area C would preserve Israel's
ability to defend itself against a resurgent eastern front. It would also be
able to continue to protect the Hashemite kingdom from violent overthrow.
All in all, bearing in mind Israel's shared interests with Jordan, the
Jordanian initiative can form the basis for discussions that could lead to
the first agreement between Israel and its neighbors that could strengthen
Israel, and promote the chances of peaceful coexistence with the
Palestinians to the benefit of all.
But here we return to the question of leadership. Israel's ability to
advance a confederative arrangement between the Palestinians and Jordan
while ensuring Israel's continued control over Area C is wholly dependent on
the skill of its leaders. Sadly, it is impossible to believe that Olmert,
who is willing to endanger the country by engaging Syria, would be capable
of conceptualizing, let alone managing such delicate discussions. Indeed, in
all likelihood, were Olmert to begin such discussions, he would do so while
running roughshod of Israel's security. And by doing so, he would cancel the
possibility of reaching a mutually beneficial arrangement for years to come.
This then points to the greatest failure of the Olmert government. Not only
is it incapable of recognizing dangers. It is also blind to opportunities.
JWR contributor Caroline B. Glick is the senior Middle East Fellow at the Center for Security Policy in Washington, DC and the deputy managing editor of The Jerusalem Post. Comment by clicking here.
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