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Jewish World Review April 14, 2005 / 5 Nisan, 5765 U.S. moves to solidify its influence in the Caucasus By George Friedman
http://www.JewishWorldReview.com |
In a little-noticed detour from his swing through Central Asia and Afghanistan, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made a stop April 12 in Azerbaijan. There, sources say, government officials agreed to host U.S. forces at three bases in what, in all likelihood, would be a long-term arrangement. A day earlier, U.S. State Department envoys met with leaders in a breakaway region of neighboring Georgia, signaling strong interest in ending that country's secessionist conflicts.
The implications of these two events — quite apart from the broader U.S. offensive into Moscow's traditional sphere of influence, where it has been supporting opposition movements in ousting authoritarian regimes — are significant. Clearly, the United States is moving to solidify its influence, both physically and via proxy, in the Caucasus — the soft underbelly of Russia.
No matter how much truth there might be to the Bush administration's public justification for its policy offensive in the region (democratization), Moscow's immediate conclusion (that Washington intends to annihilate Russia as a regional power) can be argued with equal force and logic.
The U.S. strategy in this region is complex: Moscow is correct in its belief that Washington has launched an assault against Russian influence, but the game is much larger than that. Together with Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan form a land bridge between the Black and Caspian Seas, and thus represent in important transport corridor for Caspian and Central Asian energy supplies that have attracted huge investments from the West.
At the same time, exerting control of the Caucasus would complete the United States' geopolitical encirclement of Iran. This, coupled with a string of other political investments through central Asia, would give Washington new leverage and power projection capabilities smack through the middle of what, during the Cold War, was considered "enemy" territory and, to the south, breeding grounds for Islamist militant movements.
The risks are high in both the near and long term.
First, consider the situation in Georgia, the first former Soviet republic in which Washington helped to secure pro-Western regime change. On April 11, the U.S. State Department made the not-insignificant step of sending delegates to the capital of Abkhazia — a pro-Russian province that has maintained de facto independence since a bloody war in the early 1990s — to "encourage" leaders to settle their differences with Tbilisi (where, incidentally, President George W. Bush will meet with his Georgian counterpart, Mikhail Saakashvili, on May 10). A similar message probably is being sent to leaders in South Ossetia, another pro-Russian province that seeks independence as well.
This marks the first time that the United States has involved itself in the strictly domestic affairs of former Soviet republics, rather than seeking to effect national-level policies and orientations.
There is a simple reason for this: Throughout the region, Josef Stalin carved out state boundaries in such a way that no single republic would contain undivided nationalities or ethnic groups, and all would be utterly dependent on Moscow as Soviet entities. As its interest in the region deepens, Washington will find itself inheriting some level of responsibility for resolving the ethnic conflicts and tensions that are among the most enduring aspects of Stalin's legacy.
This is true not only in Georgia, but next door in Azerbaijan as well, where Rumsfeld reportedly has secured Baku's agreement to offer up three former Soviet bases as "lily pads" for U.S. forces and aircraft. The agreement likely will generate momentum for Washington to help resolve Azerbaijan's long-running feud with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. To this end, the Americans are working with Yerevan as well; a renewed war in this area could unravel all of Washington's carefully laid plans.
In fact, if the United States is to succeed in its long-term objectives, it cannot afford to surrender even the most marginal of breakaway provinces to Russian influence. In essence, Washington faces the need to keep the entire region a stable and airtight bastion of pro-U.S. sentiment. Seemingly inconsequential places like Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which would be the most logical backdoors for Moscow to reinsert itself, will be rigorously — and likely repeatedly — examined.
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George Friedman is chairman of Strategic Forecasting, Inc., dubbed by Barron's as "The Shadow CIA," it's one of the world's leading global intelligence firms, providing clients with geopolitical analysis and industry and country forecasts to mitigate risk and identify opportunities. Stratfor's clients include Fortune 500 companies and major governments.
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Arnold Ahlert | ||||||||||||
