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Jewish World Review March 2, 2007 / 11 Adar, 5766 If Iran gets the bomb By Caroline B. Glick
Today, what Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice refers to as a "diplomatic
initiative" aimed at appeasing terror supporting, and weapons of mass
destruction proliferating Iran, and its terror supporting, and weapons of
mass destruction proliferating Syrian colony is about to take off in
Baghdad. So too, this week the US began normalizing its relations with the
terror supporting, weapons of mass destruction proliferating Stalinist
dictatorship in Pyongyang.
Bush's traditional opponents are beside themselves with glee.
With regard to North Korea, these opponents are quick to note that there has
always been great uncertainty about the level to which Kim Jung Il has
advanced in his illicit uranium enrichment program. With regard to Iran, in
an interview with the Times, former congressman Lee Hamilton warned that the
Bush administration had better not think that the negotiations with the
mullahs will lead anywhere quickly.
As the co-chairman of the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group which last
November called for the president to appease Teheran and Damascus by forcing
Israel to surrender the Golan Heights and Judea and Samaria explained,
negotiations with the mullahs have to be open ended. In his words, "You can't
expect miracles here. There has to be a sustained effort. Successful
diplomacy requires very careful preparation and very extensive
follow-through."
For his part, Hamilton's partner, former secretary of state James Baker
ecstatically declared on Tuesday night, "America must be prepared to talk to
our enemies."
What is lacking from both the media's reportage of the Bush administration's
strategic about-face, and the administration's traditional detractors'
praise for that sudden turn is an analysis of the likely downside of
appeasing the mullahs. For instance, on Wednesday the Times ran a report on
North Korea under the heading, "US Concedes Uncertainty on North Korean
Uranium Effort."
The thrust of the article, which was based on interviews with administration
sources, was that while North Korea's commitment to acquire nuclear weapons
has never been in doubt, at no time has the US had certain knowledge of its
actual capabilities. In light of the uncertainty relating to Pyongyang's
capabilities, the Bush administration was wrong, — the Times' sources
clucked — to have confronted it over its intentions.
By the same token, those who applaud the administration's decision to engage
the nuclear weapons-seeking mullahs in Teheran argue that the administration
would be wrong to confront Teheran for its stated intention to "wipe Israel
off the map," and to bring about "a world without America," since US
intelligence services are incapable of bringing unequivocal information
regarding the state of Iran's nuclear weapons program.
Clearly there is something wrong with this analysis. If what is not in doubt
is Iran's commitment to acquiring nuclear weapons, rather than base its
policies on a best-case-scenario regarding Teheran's unknown capabilities,
the US and its allies should be basing their policies on a calculation of
the risks a nuclear armed Iran would constitute for global security.
Broadly speaking there are three possible scenarios of how Iran would likely
behave were it to become a nuclear power. In the most optimistic scenario,
Iran would not attack Israel or any other country with its atomic arsenal,
but would rather use it as an instrument of international and regional
influence. In this scenario, Iran would reap economic advantage from its
nuclear status by threatening oil shipping in the Persian Gulf and so jack
up worldwide oil and gas prices. A massive economic dislocation in the oil
consuming countries would no doubt ensue. In this state of affairs, all
international economic sanctions against Iran would disappear and states
would begin fighting with one another for the right to develop Iran's oil
and gas fields and refining capabilities.
Operating under Iran's nuclear umbrella, terror groups like Hizbullah and Al
Qaida would feel free to attack at will throughout the world. The rates of
terrorism - of both the organized and lone wolf variety — would increase
exponentially throughout the world.
Regionally, Iran would work to export its Khomeinist Shiite revolution. It
would increase its interference in both Iraq and Afghanistan and so
neutralize and defeat coalition and NATO efforts to stabilize those
countries.
As to Saudi Arabia, there can be little doubt that Iran would seek to foment
an uprising of Saudi Shiites who happen to live as a repressed minority on
top of the Saudi oil fields.
Hizbullah's aim to overthrow the Siniora government in Lebanon would receive
unprecedented Iranian assistance that would likely lead to the Shiite
takeover of the country. So too, under the Iranian nuclear umbrella,
Palestinian terrorism against Israel, and Syrian adventurism against Israel
would rise steeply. The regimes in Egypt and Jordan as well as Saudi Arabia
would be sunk into chaos, insurgency and war as they themselves entered a
nuclear arms race the likes of which the world has never seen.
In a moderate scenario, not only would all the events that would likely
occur in a best-case scenario occur. Iran would also make indirect use of
its nuclear arsenal. In this case, Iran would likely use one of its existing
terror proxies in the Sinai, Gaza or Lebanon, or invent a new terror group
in one or all of these areas. Iran would transfer one or more nuclear
weapons to its terror group of choice, which would then attack Israel and
cause the second Holocaust in seventy years. Iran would deny any connection
to the attack although it would reap high praise on its perpetrators.
While Iran's leaders from Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on down have expressed a
willingness to endure an Israeli nuclear second-strike, judging from the way
in which the Western policy elites are treating Iran today, the Iranians can
have every expectation that there is every reason for the Iranians that they
can wipe Israel off the map and pay no price for their aggression either
from a destroyed Israel or from the US.
The New York Times and its counterparts will likely note that there is no
absolute certainty that Iran was behind the attack. Even the skimpiest
Iranian denials or vague allegations against countries like Pakistan or
Russia or "rogue" scientists from the former Soviet Union or Pakistan will
likely be seized upon as a justification for not responding to the attack.
Israel, it will be said, had it coming anyway, because it refused to
negotiate with the "militants" from Hamas, preferring instead to maintain
its "occupation" of the Golan Heights and Jerusalem.
In the worst case scenario, not only would Iran implement the best case and
the moderate case scenario. It would also widen its network of allies while
neutralizing its competitors in the Muslim world in order to expand its
exportation of the Khomeinist revolution worldwide. All this it would do in
an effort to achieve its longstanding aim of destroying America. Here the
Iranians would be operating under the reasonable assumption that Europe will
be neutral in the conflict, and Russia and China would likely support them
against the US — at least covertly.
In this scenario, the Iranians would strengthen their alliances with
America-haters in Latin America like Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chavez,
Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega and Cuban dictator Fidel Castro or his
heirs. It could openly supply these countries with nuclear bombs or
strengthen Hizbullah's foothold in South and North America. In the latter
case, Iran could transfer nuclear weapons and delivery systems to its terror
proxies and use these networks which include Hizbullah cells that are
already active in the US to attack the US.
Most brazenly, Iran could collaborate with its ally North Korea in
developing intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of attacking US
cities with nuclear weapons launched from Iran. At the same time, given the
US's large nuclear arsenal and ICBM capabilities, it is less likely that the
Iranians would attack the US directly.
In light of this analysis it seems that in spite of the praise it is reaping
from the policy jet-set, the Bush administration would do well to reexamine
its new policy towards Iran. It should accept their criticism and revert to
basing its policy toward the nuclear proliferating, terror-supporting rogue
state on what is known rather than on what is unknown.
Since Iran not only wants nuclear weapons, but has an active nuclear weapons
program, the question that should be guiding policymakers is not whether
Iran should be negotiated with, but rather, whether the US is willing to
accept any of the likely scenarios of what will transpire if Iran does in
fact acquire nuclear weapons. If the US is not willing to accept any of
those scenarios, then it should be asking itself what must be done to
prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power.
While Europe may be willing to sit on the sidelines of this fight, just as
it sat on the sidelines of the Cold War, and did little to prevent the Nazi
conquest of the continent in World War II, Israel has no such luxury.
In light of this, it is deeply disturbing that this week the
Olmert-Livni-Peretz government reacted to the US move towards appeasement by
claiming that it will have no impact on Israel. Rather than trying to gloss
over the dangers, Israel should be actively engaging the many forces in
Washington and elsewhere who understand the dangers of a nuclear armed Iran.
Together we should be working tirelessly to ratchet up support for a policy
based on the understanding that the world cannot abide by a nuclear armed
Iran.
JWR contributor Caroline B. Glick is the senior Middle East Fellow at the Center for Security Policy in Washington, DC and the deputy managing editor of The Jerusalem Post. Comment by clicking here.
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